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the role of formal Belief and religious 
indifference in accepting the conformist 
social orientation in post-soviet society: 
the lithuanian case1
abstract
The studies of present religious situation in Eastern Europe based mainly on quantitative surveys 
show differences from the Western Europe secularization process and detect more contradictory 
changes here, but they only draw inferences on the religious past about the post-Soviet situation in 
different Middle and Eastern European countries. The novelty of this study is to analyze how for-
mer social experiences have influenced the social life of present formal believers and religious indif-
ferent in Lithuania, who are represented by numerous vague Catholics as well as an indefinite group 
of religious indifferent formed during the Soviet regime and due to the peculiarities of their social 
and personal experiences. Two types of empirical research methods (quantitative and qualitative) are 
used for the research question, applying the development principle in a sequence with the ‘quantita-
tive preliminary’ and ‘qualitative follow-up’ for elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and clarifi-
cation of the results from one method with the results from the other one. This yields a better under-
standing of the religious attitudes and social behavior of this group. Meanwhile the complementarity 
principle, where two methods of empirical research are used to assess different aspects in forming 
a new social group of vague Catholics and religious indifferent, gives possibility to analyze how the 
experiences of the Soviet regime manifest themselves in their personal lives of the post-Soviet sit-
uation with forming a specific phenomenon in the direction of religious identity and general social 
orientations. On the basis of oral life histories three types of religious indifference are distinguished.
Słowa klucze: kanoniczne wierzenia, różnorodność religijna, badania ilościowe, ustna historia 
życia, zbiorowa tożsamość religijna, społeczna orientacja, społeczny konformizm
key wordS: formal belief, religious indifference, quantitative research, oral life histories, collec-
tive religious identity, social orientations, social conformism 
1 The present paper oriented to the analysis of the Lithuanian population group, which is dis-
tinguished on the basis of its religious and social orientations, is part of a larger research project 
“Christians in Lithuania before and after rebuilding the Independenceˮ conducted at the Lithuanian 
Catholic Academy of Sciences and funded by the Research Council of Lithuania - LIT-7-11.
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introduction
The reflection of the consequences of the Soviet regime on religious identi-
ty as well as social orientations is a topic of numerous sociological research based 
on quantitative surveys in Eastern Europe (Tomka, Zulehner, 2000; Tomka, 2005, 
2006, 2011; Zrinščak, 2004; Pollack, Müller and Pickel, 2012) as well as in Lithu-
ania (Laumenskaitė, 1993; Žiliukaitė, 2007). There are also studies that used quali-
tative research methods (interviews, testimonies, archive documents, letters etc.) to 
analyse the experience of the suppressive totalitarian regime of persons in different 
countries (Bauer, Inkeles and Kluckhohn, 1956; Humphrey, Miller, Zdravomyslo-
va, 2003; Bertaux , Thompson, Ritkirch, 2006; Applebaum, 2012; Davoliute, 2012, 
2013) , but still only few studies were oriented not follow how these experiences in-
fluenced personal life in the post-Soviet situation (Blebea Nicolae, 2003) The meth-
odological novelty of this study is, above all, in complementarity where two meth-
ods of empirical research are used to assess different aspects of the research question, 
and the findings from one method used to elaborate or explain the findings of the oth-
er; the novelty is also in development where one method is used explicitly to assist 
another (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham, 1998; O’Cathain, 2010). In this study both 
methods will be undertaken in a sequence with ‘quantitative preliminary’ and ‘qual-
itative follow-up’ for elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and clarification of the 
results from one method with the results from the other one. This will give a better 
understanding of religious attitudes and social behaviour and the underlying assump-
tions of cultural values.
The analysis of phenomenon of formal belief and religious indifference is based 
on the data of quantitative and qualitative empirical research conducted simultane-
ously in two time periods2. The quantitative surveys give a possibility to show the 
features of believers (involved, formal and nominal Catholics in traditionally Catho-
lic Lithuanian society after the collapse of the Soviet regime) and unbelievers in their 
attitudes towards social challenges as well as their social participation. This will be 
the empirical frame for the analysis of this phenomenon in a more humanly concrete 
and sequential context of personal oral life histories of formal Catholics and reli-
giously indifferent persons (a sample of 30 life histories). The second novelty of this 
study is that the qualitative research will analyse them in relation to their personal and 
social past, exploring what experiences in their lives during the Soviet regime have 
influenced their present religious identity and social orientations. Unlike the secular-
2 European Value Study of two waves in 1999 and 2008, and the national representative quan-
titative survey “Faith and religiosity in Lithuania, 2013” (conducted by I.E. Laumenskaite in collab-
oration with the public opinion and market research centre “Vilmorus Ltd.ˮ), as well as two-stage 
qualitative research using the biographical method that was carried out in 1997–1999 (in the frame 
of the International Research Project “Aufbruch: Social Positioning of the Christian Churches in 
Eastern Europe Before and After Communism”, Pastorales Forum e.V., Austria, 19972000) and in 
2013 (the project “Christians in Lithuania before and after rebuilding the Independence” conducted 
at the Lithuanian Catholic Academy of Sciences and funded by the Research Council of Lithuania 
- LIT-7–11).
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ization process in Western Europe (Davie, 2012; Meulemann, 2004), the Lithuanian 
case has its peculiarities due to the outcomes of the former extremely rude religious 
persecution and the reality of the current rapid secularization process in religiously 
homogeneous society. 
peculiarities of the lithuanian religious context 
As a traditionally Catholic European society, Lithuania differs from traditionally 
Catholic Western European countries not only due to its later process of moderniza-
tion, the long-lasting religious persecution of the Soviet regime with forcible laiciza-
tion (much stronger than in Poland, Croatia and other countries of the former Sovi-
et bloc that were not incorporated into the Soviet Union) and also because of belated 
Christianization. Lithuania was the last country in Europe that was Christianized in 
the late14th–early 15th century after the long-lasting resistance against the invasions 
of the Teutonic knights. That still relates the national identity with the specific Bal-
tic cultural and religious background as an important heritage, which was highlighted 
during the Soviet regime mainly by urban intellectuals as Lithuanian laïcité in oppo-
sition to the Catholic Church (Streikus, 2002, p. 258). The outcomes of forcible la-
icization and expulsion of Christian religious life from the public space, the present 
rapid liberalization of post-communist society, as well as the challenges of the glo-
balization process reinforced the search for national and religious identity in the pre-
Christian past that opened the door to national neo-paganism and other forms of New 
Age religiosity. It is easily combined with formal Catholic identification as a collec-
tive historical and cultural norm when almost non-practicing Catholics returned to 
the Church filling a religious void that appeared with an unexpectedly fast ending of 
the imposed Soviet regime. 
The dominant Catholic Church in Lithuania gained social respect during the So-
viet occupation as the only legal institution that openly resisted the religious perse-
cutions and communist ideology. The situation of religion during the Soviet regime 
in Lithuania (from an international perspective and the sociological point of view) 
was interpreted as an example of “secular monopoles” with forcible control even on 
the level of private practice (Codevilla,1983; Martin, 1987). In Lithuania after the 
collapse of this regime in a short time several legislative changes happened: the law 
on the separation of the Church and the State (the principle of neutrality) was adopt-
ed in 1990, to be followed by other agreements: on the possibilities of the Church in 
the sphere of education, chaplaincy in the military and the restitution of property ex-
propriated by the Soviet regime, which is still complicated. For the juridical regula-
tion of the relations between religion and the State, the law of religious communities 
as organized religious institutions with differentiation of their public possibilities ac-
cording to the level of their state recognition was also enacted during the first peri-
od of Lithuania’s Independence. Nine traditional religions and denominations started 
to rebuild their structures and activities in the country and international organiza-
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tions. Long-lasting restricted participation in church services gradually turned into its 
opposite, and the number of citizens who considered themselves Catholics increased 
from 57% in 1990 to 73–79% during the following 7–9 years (Laumenskaitė, 2003; 
Žiliukaitė, 2000). Does it point to the present model of European religiosity, named 
as “vicarious” religion or “fuzzy fidelity”? (Davie, 2010; Bruce, Voas, 2010). How 
is it related with active belonging to the Catholic Church and involving Christians in 
social life, when the dominant Lithuanian identity is to consider oneself a Catholic 
mainly because of the historical and cultural tradition? 
conceptual considerations 
What does it mean to be a catholic?
The historically long-lasting and still widespread understanding of being a Cath-
olic in Lithuania (75–79% of the adult population) means first and foremost to be 
baptized and to belong to a traditionally Catholic nation3. To the older generation 
this signifies the experience and strength to survive staying a Catholic during almost 
two centuries of Russian occupation (especially in the period of the Soviet regime). 
A usual answer to the question “Why are you a Catholic?” points to the historical-
cultural tradition: “Our parents and grandparents were Catholics, so we are Catholics 
as well”. But this also points to the predominant collective identities – both Catho-
lic and Lithuanian (the same applies to Polish Catholics), which were typical of tra-
ditional society, but are challenged by modern one. The new wave of European secu-
larization and post-modern irreligious mentality has above all influenced the younger 
generations; however, it does not change the dominant Lithuanian religious identi-
ty: the persistent cultural obligation of parents or grandparents is to baptize a new 
born child and in many cases ensure him/her the possibility to receive the First Com-
munion. Everything else in the child’s religious life is left to his/her free later deci-
sion without taking into consideration the influence of the contemporary social and 
mass media. If the Church considers baptism an obligation, her efforts to involve the 
parents in the preparation of their children for the First Communion are of little suc-
cess. Due to that more than 20%4 of the population as well as nominal Catholics think 
that to be a Catholic means only to be baptized without further obligation to attend 
the Church. But the largest group is Catholics with formal or casual Catholic identi-
ty – those who attend church mainly on religious feast days (Christmas, Easter), go 
to a confession once a year but do not participate in church life more than that. This 
3 Data of a national representative quantitative survey “Faith and religiosity in Lithuania, 
2013” (conducted by I. E. Laumenskaitė together with the public opinion and market research cen-
tre “Vilmorus Ltd.”), where N=1400.
4 Ibidem. 
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is the “normative” attitude for 45% of Catholics5. In comparison with other tradi-
tionally Catholic European countries (Jakelic S., 2010), these “occasional” or “feast” 
Catholics comprise the largest part (almost a half) of the Catholics in Lithuania, what 
confirms the still existing collective religious identity, more common to Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. 
irreligion and unbelief as social compliance or/and conformity
The notions of irreligion, unbelief, disbelief, non-theism and atheism are still used 
with different contents influenced by the theoretical framework, social context and 
sociological tradition (Borowik, Ančić, Tyrała, 2013; Zuckerman, 2007; Zrinščak, 
2004, p. 223). In this analysis we will apply a wider notion of irreligion (irreligious) 
to describe religious identity and attitudes that characterize those who consider them-
selves Catholics – naming them as formal (casual) or nominal due to their minimal 
or almost non-existent church practice, vague understanding of superior power (God) 
and other characteristics of religious identity. The notion of unbelief (unbeliever) will 
be used in the case of absence of Catholic (Christian) identity (according to the per-
son’s own identification of his/her unbelief and no religious practice). The latter cat-
egory will be used only in the analysis of qualitative research data if the facts of the 
informant’s life and his/her own identification permit this distinction. The notions of 
atheism and atheistic behaviour will be applied to describe the ideology and actions 
of the Soviet regime that had a definite content and manifestations in the past and also 
appeared in the informants’ life histories. Those who identified themselves as unbe-
lievers, and there were no their life events and behaviour to contradict such self-iden-
tification, they could be named non-theists if they did not proclaim or impose athe-
ism as a worldview on others. 
Usually the concept of social conformity is dominant in the analysis of reli-
gious and general social attitudes as well as behavioural models, and manifests it-
self in sharing similar beliefs and standards of behaviour. It can be a reflected atti-
tude but most often is un-reflected as a response to the social impact of the social 
group to which a person belongs, as well as general social conditioning (Ridgeway, 
2000, p. 400). Finally, it is the internal acceptance of a definite social influence in 
the process of socialization and often in its complexity manifests itself as social 
conformism. Religious conformity is typical of a historically collective religion 
and manifests itself conditioning a religious (Catholic) person with either formal, 
rare religious practice, or even religiously indifferent and nowadays even irreli-
gious person. It is characteristic of the generation born in the later period of the So-
viet regime in Lithuania, when forcible exclusion of religious life, which matched 
with continual atheist socialization in school, finally became a common experience. 
However, conformity was not only religious, but also social, and finally turned 
5 Ibidem.
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into conformism regarding the Soviet reality and its definite social patterns with-
out any interest in political and social participation – an ambivalent stultifying ex-
istence (Štromas, 2001, p. 225; Putinaitė, 2007, p. 175) oriented mainly to private 
life with concern for one’s material well-being. Compliance (Ridgeway,2000; Cial-
dini & Goldstein, 2004), as a particular kind of response to mainly external pres-
sure was a reaction typical of the generations who lived during World War II and 
the post-war period of armed resistance to the Soviet occupation. They lived in fear 
of repressions, but the majority remained in internal opposition to the new politi-
cal system and ideology. Because of Soviet persecutions, religious identity could 
not be expressed publicly and in many cases gradually turned to socially vague reli-
gious attitudes with rare or even non-existent religious practice. This was most typ-
ical of teachers and intellectuals who secretly celebrated Christmas and Easter at 
home, baptized their children and even took the sacrament of marriage if they were 
urged by parents or somebody in their families. Social orientations in many cases 
became even more compliant with the existing regime due to personal needs and 
interests to survive and to have larger social possibilities and rewards (Klumbys, 
2009). Internal opposition to the political system in most cases was expressed in 
the duality between official behaviour in public and non-official behaviour in the 
non-public sphere, discontent with the political system in “kitchen conversations” 
and manifestations of “thinking in one mode, speaking in another one, and acting 
in the third one”(Klumbys, 2008), An exception was the opposition of the Catholic 
Church to religious repressions based on strong religious identity and anti-Soviet 
national resistance (Girnius, 1989; The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithu-
ania, 1989), which expressed the importance of religious attitudes in relation to so-
cial ones. Therefore, the research on formal and informal behaviour as well as re-
ligious attitudes during the Soviet occupation allows us to see not only the specific 
process of secularization in Lithuania, but also the role of religious identity in the 
formation of social orientations in Soviet and post-Soviet society. 
the general situation of beliefs and religiosity in lithuania as a context  
of personal religious identity and social orientations in post-soviet society
The changes of the role of religion in contemporary society in general could be 
reflected in the frame defined by Peter Beyer, who divided the approaches of eminent 
scholars of this field into three categories: “religious comeback” by Berger and Ha-
bermas, “religious transformation” by Taylor and Casanova, and “alternative scena-
rios” by Bhargava and Modood (Beyer, 2013, p. 664). 
The prevailing theory of inescapable secularization in the modernization pro-
cess of contemporary societies in view of wide sociological studies is no longer con-
sidered axiomatic (Berger, 1999; Berger, Davie, 2008; Karpov, 2010), although the 
comparative European Values Study and World Values study launched in 1981 were 
methodologically based on this assumption. 
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In the Lithuanian case we have a more complicated situation: the country went 
through a specific Soviet modernization, which was accompanied by even more for-
cible laicization. This process finally led to the secularization of society, but in a dif-
ferent way: losing the possibility and then the capacity to participate in Church life 
and to practice one’s Christian belief in a way adequate to Christianity and contempo-
rary society. However, a tangible return to religious practice that in 1999 differentia-
ted Poland, Croatia and Lithuania as traditionally Catholic post-Soviet countries to-
gether with the Orthodox Romania from mainly Protestant ex-Soviet bloc countries6 
is related with a specific process: the nation’s strengthening religious identity, which 
was and still is strongly based on collective ethnic-confessional identification. It ur-
ged the older and middle-age generations to return to at least formal religious pra-
ctice, which was suspended but not culturally lost during the Soviet occupation. Ho-
wever, it manifests itself mainly in following several traditional religious customs 
due to the cultural consideration that it is important to hold religious service for such 
events as birth, marriage and death (Halman, 2001, p. 80.) At least occasional religio-
us practice is continued in families where parents practiced or now resumed attending 
church, but is decreasing in those where church is only attended during funerals or 
other exceptional events. By opening ourselves to the life of postmodern society and 
the European process of secularization, we have a specific phenomenon: ambiguous 
religiosity with still prevailing collective Catholic identity inherited from the histo-
rical past, and a postmodern individual dualistic religiosity as an outcome of Soviet 
religious repressions and the contemporary process of religious individualism mixed 
with elements of New Age religiousness. 
Due to that reason, the most adequate instrument in the analysis of religious 
changes could be based on the approach of three corresponding theories, which are 
applied in analysing the development of churchliness and religiosity in post-com-
munist countries (Müller, 2011). The decline of individual religious practice as well 
as the significance of the Church in personal life that is attributed to the seculariza-
tion theory can also characterize Lithuania’s situation; but simultaneously there is 
an opposite tendency to secularization – a latent individual need for religion, where 
a church affiliation and private religiosity have gained greater importance. It is also 
supported by the second theoretical approach in the tradition of Thomas Luckmann, 
who sees religion more or less explicitly as an anthropological constant. Due to that 
reason, religion now experiences a transformation towards its “invisible” variants, 
“characterized by increasing religious vagueness, syncretism and depersonalization 
of the concept of God, and a shift towards sacralization of the inner-self” (Müller, 
2011, p. 22). As concerns the secularization approach, it would be adequate to use 
Jose Casanova’s interpretation (Casanova, 2011) taking into account three theoret-
ical aspects of secularization that point to different components of this phenome-
non: differentiation or “emancipation” from religious institutions and norms of three 
main secular spheres (the state, economy and science); secularization as a decline 
6 These counties had the smallest number of non-confessional population. Source: European 
Values Study and GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences, EVS 1999. 
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of religious beliefs and practices; and secularization as the privatization of religion 
(Casanova, 2011, p. 60). The latter aspect in Lithuania was described above. The 
emancipation of the state, economy and science from religious institutions as a so-
cial process started already in independent Lithuania in the period between 1918 and 
1940. During the Soviet occupation it was radically maintained along with the sup-
pression of religion even in private life and radical separation of the Church from all 
spheres of public life with a wide range of forcible atheistic propaganda, above all, 
in primary and secondary schools. Due to that reason, the decline of religious prac-
tice was already radical in the generation born between 1949 and 1958 (30% attend-
ed church on Sundays during their childhood, mainly in rural areas) and diminished 
even more in the generation born between 1969 and 1978 (57% attended church once 
a year or even not at all)7.
A wide-ranging return to the Church after the collapse of Soviet regime was 
a contradictory phenomenon. For the most part, it was an appearance: religiousness 
hidden for decades became apparent as the process of filling the void that opened in 
people’s worldviews and life practices. At the same time, it widely became a custom-
religion that returned as part of the cultural tradition, which strengthened satisfac-
tion, social attitudes, nationalism and, in the beginning, right-wing political attitudes, 
but little influenced personal and conscious interest in the knowledge of the Christian 
doctrine, adequate practices of faith and participation in church (parish) life. There-
fore, for a further analysis of religious identity we cannot use the classification of 
Catholic believers according to the criteria of Ester, Halman and de Moor (Ester, Hal-
man and de Moore, 1993) not only for the lack of participation of Catholics in church 
life (only about 3%), but also due to the main criterion of being a practicing Catholic. 
For that purpose, in the classification and cluster analysis we will use two doctrinally 
necessary Church requirements: regular church attendance and practicing the sacra-
ment of reconciliation. These requirements can be applied only for the data of the na-
tional representative survey (N=1400) of 2013, where a larger scale of adequate ques-
tions on the Catholic faith and practice was used. The data of EVS will be used rather 
limitedly in this analysis, because the questions on religious matters were formulat-
ed in a manner compatible with different religions (in rather abstract ways) with the 
aim to evaluate the general role of religion as such for the process of modernization 
and, therefore, questions about the beliefs and practice of the Christian faith were too 
limited. Due to that reason, not all the indicators of the religiosity scale (Krech, Hero 
& others, 2013, p.8) constructed in EVS surveys will be used for this analysis either. 
The general importance of religion (as very important in private life) diminished 
among the entire population from 15% in 1990 to 10% in 2008 with predominance of 
the answers “quite important” (34%) and “not important” (42%). Besides, the impor-
tance of God in one’s life dropped from the average of 6.7 points in 1999 to 6.3 points 
in 2008 (among Catholics – from 7.4 to 6.9). Confidence in the Church among the 
general population gradually diminished as well from 15% in 1990 to 13% in 2008. 
7 Data of the representative quantitative empirical research “Faith and religiosity in Lithuania, 
2013”.
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Meanwhile, the identification of oneself as a religious person increased among the 
entire population from 47% in 1990 to 79% in 2008 almost analogously to the rise of 
considering oneself a Catholic; and among Catholics – from 72% to 93%. 
As the majority of the population consists of Catholics (79% in 2008–2013), it 
is reasonable to present other important indications of the religiosity scale separate-
ly for them. 
figure 1. church attendance of catholics. lithuanian data of evs 1990–2008 and of representative 
survey “faith and religiosity in lithuania, 2013”
According to figure 1, almost a half of those who consider themselves Catho-
lics (57% in 1990 and 75–80% several years later) practice their religiousness mainly 
during Christmas and Easter with traditional celebrations in families, which are grad-
ually losing their religious content, and practice short and formal prayers only dur-
ing these feasts (25% in 2013). That is expressed by commercial advertising, publi-
cations and broadcasts in mass media as well as oral testimonies. But a large part of 
Catholics in Lithuania (60% in 2013) also receive the Sacrament of Reconciliation at 
least once a year. Weekly participation in the Mass slightly diminished but stabilized 
with church attendance once a month. Differences of attendance depend not only on 
the age group (diminishing in younger generations), but also on the type of settle-
ment (major differentiation is in cities where there is a larger number of those who at-
tend church as well as more non-Christians and nonbelievers). But the answers to the 
question how those who consider themselves Catholics participate in church services 
Once a week 
or more often
Once a month Only on speci-
fic holy days
Once a year or 
less often
Never. practi-
cally never
16 18 42 18 6
14 16 49 17 4
21 17 44 12 5
20 18 39 14 6
How often do you attend religious services?
Basis: all catholics, Lithuania
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
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point both to prevailing contemporary individualized religiousness (“I silently pray 
regarding my own needs and difficulties” – more than 80%) and culturally normative 
Catholicity (a third of the chosen answers is “I go to Mass because as a Catholic I was 
taught to do so” and “I simply go to church and listen without getting involved”). 
figure 2. the statements those were closest to the beliefs of catholics in lithuania – the concepts 
of “superior power”
According to these statements (unlike the English version, the first statement 
in the Lithuanian questionnaire of 1999 and 2008 was not “personal God” but only 
“God”), the Christian concept of the personal God or the living triune God (in the 
national survey of 2013) is accepted by less than a half of those who consider them-
selves Catholics; others prefer the concept of spirit or life force more frequently used 
in New Age terminology, or some “scientific” concept. 
The dominant vague Catholic identity also manifests itself in believing in rein-
carnation, which is common to a third of Catholics in Lithuania, with the same pro-
portion of those who are not sure about it.8 This points to a hypothesis that a larger 
half of Catholics do not distinguish between the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation 
of God and the concept of “reincarnations of the souls” taken from New Age relig-
iosity, which is close to religious syncretism. The key question to identify the con-
tent of Christian belief was the personal conception of Jesus Christ (“Who is Jesus 
Christpersonally to you?”). Only 46% of those who consider themselves Catholics 
8 Data of the national representative survey “Faith and religiosity in Lithuania, 2013”.
Concepts of superior power
EVS. Basis: all catholics, Lithuania
Concepts of superior power
Lithuania, 2013
No spirit,
God of life force
Don’t know
what to think
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the world
There is some spirit
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acknowledge him as the Son of God/God who became Man; for a third he is only 
a human being, and 20% have doubts whether Jesus Christ existed as a historical per-
son at all9.
Summing up the presented part of empirical data, religious identity in Lithuania 
could be described as a two-sided phenomenon, both aspects of which are named as 
the European attitude toward religion: the first one is “belonging without believing” 
as Christian identification without an expression of faith that entails a distant shared 
memory, which does not necessitate a shared belief, but which – even from a distance 
– still governs collective reflexes in terms of identity (Hervieu-Léger, 2006, p. 48; 
Jakelic, 2010, p. 1‒14); the second one is a “vicarious” type of religion – “believing 
without belonging” (Davie, 2000, p. 33) The latter concept is empirically useful ap-
proach to European secularization and more adequate in regard to religiousness of 
younger generations in Lithuania.
These types of European religiosity were distinguished in defining the predom-
inant types of Catholics in Lithuania while singling out the groups by their partici-
pation in the Mass and receiving the Sacrament of Reconciliation (two main official 
requirements for Catholics) for their cluster analysis. We have distinguished three 
major groups: (1) earnest (active) Catholics with weekly or more frequent attendance 
of church service and practicing the confession several times a year – 13%; (2) for-
mal or casual Catholics attending church service mainly during Christmas and Easter 
and practicing the confession at least once a year – 29%; (3) nominal Catholics with 
church attendance once a year or less often and not practicing the sacrament of Rec-
onciliation – 43% of those who consider themselves Catholics10.
Formal or “religious feast” Catholics in general could be described by a trend 
in the European process of secularization called “belonging without believing”. 
They are working-age men and women, usually descending from rural areas or small 
towns, from families with practicing members; married and mainly in the church, 
most have basic or vocational education; they attend church service to pray privately 
for their personal needs, pray less than once per week, understand their belief as for-
mal church attendance or coming to church to sit in silence for a conversation with 
oneself; they do not participate in parish life and do not share their faith with others, 
usually having no experience of personal Christian conversion, and understand their 
Catholicity as a cultural norm accepting it in a conformist manner.
“Nominal Catholics” who constitute the majority of those who were categorized 
according to the two above-mentioned criteria consider themselves Catholics only be-
cause they were baptized; they are often young men (up to 44 years old), usually born 
in a town or a city, frequently not married or married once and not in the church, have 
lived in cohabitation before, and many of them are divorced, usually without children; 
they seldom have somebody in the family who practices the Catholic faith, understand 
their belief as a conversation with the inner self, mainly do not pray, attend church on 
rare special occasions, and usually think that Jesus Christ was only a man or doubt 
9 Ibidem.
10 Ibidem.
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whether he ever lived; they are also not interested in Christian issues and do not think 
that the Church is necessary for their Catholic identity. They can identify themselves 
even as “believing without belonging” or hardly believing (religious) at all. 
The two latter groups among those who consider themselves Catholic are more 
oriented to private life and individual well-being almost without any orientation to 
social participation (especially nominal Catholics – 80% of them do not take part in 
any voluntary activity). The religious factor has a certain influence on the respon-
dents’ attitudes to solidarity (both general and towards socially excluded people), ci-
vic morality and support of political community. Those who never or almost never 
attend church expressed lesser compassion for aged, suffering and socially excluded 
people, which, in its turn, increased in younger generations already in the first deca-
de of independent Lithuania – in 1990–1999 (Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2006). The 
same tendency of decrease is observed in the dynamics of attitudes towards charitab-
le actions based on moral motives, and the opposite tendency – towards charitable 
actions based on the motives of individual interest (Žiliukaitė, 2007, p. 49‒69). Non-
-religious younger generations exhibit a more expressed tendency to private interests 
and private life, with growing permissiveness regarding illegal civic actions (tax che-
ating, claiming state benefits to which one is not entitled, accepting a bribe in the co-
urse of one’s duties, avoiding to pay a fare in public transport). It was also expressed 
in value orientations regarding family life and the value of a human being (attitudes 
to abortion and euthanasia). 
Little orientation to social participation and general preference for individual 
well-being could be explained, on the one hand, by the outcomes of the former re-
pressive system (distrust and disinterest in social life, lack of personal capacities 
to take initiative and responsibility): “Soviet citizens could be described as negati-
vely atomized. The institutions on which they relied were informal units that depen-
ded upon diffuse face-to-face ties that lacked legal recognition” (Rose, Mishler, Ha-
erpfer, 1997, p. 90), and on the other hand, by a certain decline of generalized social 
trust in society considering that most people can be trusted (from 32% in 1990 to 25% 
in 1999). This can be explained as disenchantment with current political and econo-
mic changes in comparison with former large expectations about life in free socie-
ty and an independent state. Lithuania is distinguished among other European coun-
tries by the lowest participation in voluntary work – non-government organizations 
and movements (Adam, 2008; Žiliukaitė, Ramonaitė, Nevinskaitė, Bersnevičiūtė, 
Vinogradnaitė, 2006, p. 28‒29; Primožič , Bavec, 2009) – low average trust in natio-
nal and EU institutions, low general satisfaction with life and rather low assessment 
of national economy, corruption in juridical services and public health sector, as well 
as low value judgment of personal happiness in comparison with other traditionally 
Catholic European countries (Laumenskaitė, 2003; Tomka, 2006, p. 255). The new 
radical atomization of society is proved by a very high suicide rate in Lithuania (Var-
nik, 2012) – especially among males, – which contradicts Durkheim’s theory but 
shows that even Catholicism in this case does not work as a factor opposite to this so-
cial process. The suicide rate was already high in the last decade of the Soviet regime 
and having dropped in 1990, radically increased five years after Independence. 
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We can hypothesize that being a formal and especially nominal Catholic (bap-
tized and attending church only on the main Christian feasts or the occasions of 
someone’s baptism, marriage or funeral) could be treated as a new form of uncon-
scious social compliance and conformity due to the heritage of collective cultural 
identity. This matches with orientation mainly towards private life as a pattern of so-
cio-historical habitus (Bourdieu, 1980; 1989) and the corresponding dispositions for 
social behaviour. How it is expressed in personal lives of unbelievers and religiously 
indifferent people (the majority of the latter were baptizedand received formal, mini-
mal religious formation in childhood) and how it depends on the experience of their 
religious or atheist socialization and religious identity? These matters will be descri-
bed in the analysis of oral life histories collected in 1997–1999 and 2013 (the time-
-periods of the above-discussed empirical qualitative surveys). 
method, subjects and results of qualitative research
The focus of biographical analysis is not only the reconstruction of intentionality 
(in this case religious and social), which is represented as an individual’s life course, 
but also the embeddedness of the biographical account in social macro structures that 
is emphasized by many scholars in qualitative research (Thompson, 2000; Bornat, 
2008; Merrill,2009; Humphrey, Miller, Zdravomyslova, 2003). On the other hand, 
definite personal experiences that influenced their life decisions are open to constant 
recreation in the light of the present, and hypothetically explain their former and cur-
rent attitudes in the context of social life. The research of oral life histories seeks to 
reveal the continuity of religious identity analysing its factors or its possible change. 
The main novelty of this research is the religious and social experience of religio-
usly indifferent people (unbelievers and formal/nominal Catholics) in the entire con-
text of their personal life both during the Soviet regime and the radical social trans-
ition of Lithuania after its collapse while inquiring into the factors of their religious 
identity and social orientations. What describes a new type of a religiously indifferent 
person and unbeliever in the post-Soviet traditionally Catholic country when the pra-
cticing of religion became legal and even socially desirable? Even today (more than 
two decades after the restoration of Lithuania’s Independence) it was complicated to 
persuade people belonging to the latter group to be interviewed about their beliefs 
and social involvement in the course of their life. Those who withdrew from the in-
terview usually were men who were socially active during the last stage of the Soviet 
regime and are now prolonging their social activity and career mainly by having joi-
ned the Social-Democratic Party. They preferred not to speak about their Soviet past 
and the ways to adapt to the new social situation. Social cautiousness or even fear of 
being different and non-conformant with socially predominant orientations – a “cul-
ture of distrust” (Sztompka, 1996) – is still the historically inherited social attitude of 
the majority due to the deficiency of cultural resources for trust and, especially, due 
to the low predisposition to trust that formed early in life (Uslaner, 2008).
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Formal Catholics and religiously indifferent persons interviewed in 1997–1999 
(a sample of 18 life histories) were respondents with predominantly Soviet social 
experience (especially the older ones) who lived only 7–9 years in the context of the 
national religious revival and officially permitted religious practice, responding to it 
passively (attending church only on major religious feasts or hardly attending at all) 
and remaining in doubtregarding religious matters. Those who were interviewed in 
2013 have a longer social experience of post-Soviet liberal and generally postmo-
dern society but, nevertheless, both groups have a comparable predominantly religio-
us identity. Life histories based on the biographical method were collected as conver-
sations with interviews lasting 1.5–4 hours each. A comparative analysis of those two 
samples was made using Qualitative data analysis software NVivo 10. 
Slightly more than a half of the religiously indifferent informants in both samples 
(in total, 30 persons) are women. However, more males than females were involved 
in Soviet ideological activity. An important demographic characteristic of these in-
formants is the historical period when they were born and received their primary (as 
well as religious) socialization. A little less than a half of the irreligious informants 
surveyed in 1997–1999 were from the 1936–1945 birth cohort, having an experien-
ce of Soviet occupation or/and war shock in their early life. Three men were born in 
the first period of independent Lithuania, so at the beginning of the Soviet regime 
and repressions they were mainly adolescents. More than a half of religiously indiffe-
rent women interviewed in 1997–1999 were born in 1966–1975 and lived their con-
scious life in the late Soviet period with predominant conformity to the regime ac-
cepted already as natural. Five irreligious respondents among the twelve interviewed 
in 2013 were also born in that period, which could influence their religious identity. 
Others were born in earlier historical periods and were affected by more radical so-
cial changes and atheistic propaganda. It influenced their participation in the structu-
res of the occupational regime. After its collapse their former religious and social atti-
tudes haven’t changed or only partly changed because of religious and social habitus 
formed in their early life. This qualitative research will focus, on the one hand, on the 
genetic analysis of narrated life histories reconstructing the biographical meaning of 
experiences at the time they happened and the chronological sequence of experien-
ces in which they occurred; and on the other hand – on the thematic fields (Rosenthal, 
1993), which are the most important for the analysis of the content and change of re-
ligious identity, and which appeared in every oral life history (or were revealed in its 
analysis as concepts). 
a.  the main thematic fields of life events and social contexts of irreligious  
persons’ life experience
The general early matrix of this qualitative research was oriented towards a spe-
cial focus on the informants’ religious identity and social orientations. It gave the 
frame for the main concepts that were specified during the analysis of life histo-
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ries. They are presented in the order of priority according to the influence on religious 
identity and its changes in relation to social orientation.
The most important factor that differentiates religious and religiously indifferent 
informants is the primal religious experiences in childhood and possible later life ex-
periences that challenged the personal belief and religious practice. Its analysis gave 
the basis to distinguish three different types of irreligiousness among this group of 
religiously indifferent informants, and correlated with other concepts as factors of 
religious identity and social orientations both during the Soviet regime and after-
wards. Its essence is the existence or absence of some personal experience in relation 
to God due to the religious behaviour of family members or/and due to the further life 
challenges that may have led to existential questions (only in few cases they led to re-
ligious conversion after the collapse of the regime). 
That primary factor is related to the second one – the influence of atheistic prop-
aganda and personal relation to it. Atheistic propaganda, especially in primary and 
secondary school, was one of the first steps in enforcing Soviet ideology. This made 
an influence on the young generation, especially when there was fear and little reli-
gious practice in their own families or, even more importantly, an openness to con-
form to the new regime and hopes for better social perspectives:
You felt as if somebody pressed you from above: ‘Do not say anything, be silent’. We felt that 
we had to fear something. In the family it was explained that now we couldn’t go to church, 
because the communists had come, and they did not believe in God. And in school it was al-
ways emphasized that science had already proven that God did not exist, so religion was only 
an ancient prejudice. And then at home: ‘Don’t raise any questions, be submissive – you can’t 
do anything. We have to live like that now’.’So the child tried to follow his parents’ position 
or to trust more what was said in school and even accepted that his parents were already old-
-fashioned. (Vladas, 1936)11
We had a teacher of history, who was an active Komsomol member himself and constan-
tly repeated: ‘All these priests and their companions assaulted our ancestors with the sword...’ 
and constantly spoke negative things about Christianization in Lithuania that according to him 
was a great disaster to us. In the end he usually added: ‘As to me... I am a pagan as our ance-
stors were’. (Dovilė, 1971) 
In some cases religious indifference was influenced by a negative interaction with 
people of the Church (mainly priests who refused to consider the complicated situa-
tion or were seen in disreputable shape). In most cases it did not provoke a cause for 
dis-conversion or the loss of faith (Barbou, 1994, p. 106–121), except when the per-
son already had some doubt about it and usually had little or only perfunctory reli-
gious practice in childhood; in that case, the existing ideological pressure and social 
fear led to more strongly expressed irreligiousness. The enforcement of Soviet prop-
aganda and possible mistrust in the Church often operated upon religious identity to-
gether with the social and religious family background and experiences of political vi-
olence in personal, parents’ or even grandparents’ lives. Persons from poor families 
11 Here and herein after excerpts from the informants life histories used in quotations are signed 
with pseudonyms but the real birth year of the informants is given.
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whose members had little or formal religious practice were discontent with their eve-
ryday conditions of former life and often frightened at the experienced partisans’ ac-
tions during the complicated period of post-war Lithuanian partisan resistance against 
the Soviet regime (somebody in family suffered from them), and directly or indirectly 
participated in the actions of Soviet military forces. Due to that they were more active-
ly involved in the process of the local establishing of Soviet structures and the “bright 
future” of Soviet life that most of them, at least initially, believed in (Štromas, 2001, p. 
212‒213). Therefore, they mostly became fully indifferent to Catholic identity, ceased 
any possible religious practice and even opposed it due to the obtained social status. 
But if any violence of the Soviet forces was experienced (family members were 
deported, killed or forced to emigrate), a hidden personal disapproval of Soviet ide-
ology was formed, but in most cases it was not expressed in any social actions due to 
fear and the wish to survive: 
That period left a memory of fear because I had to keep the fact of my deported father 
secret. When I left to study I was afraid to receive a bad mark and lose my stipend. What will 
I say to my mother when she can’t help me materially? My basic goal was to fight my way 
out of that poverty, to graduate from the institute, to begin to work, maybe to carve out a ca-
reer (Vytautas, 1936) 
That could be matched with earlier or later social orientation to participate in the 
Soviet political-ideological or educational system due to social pragmatism that was 
usually explained by “seeking a better life for one’s family and especially children” 
(Ona, 1935) as well as by “the effort to do good to people by taking socially respon-
sible positions”, which was often specified: “Why did we join the Communist party? 
For the career, to receive a better position that it could award. After all... this did not 
change the individual’s way of thinking – you remained as you were before” (Veroni-
ka, 1944). This attitude and behaviour could correlate in several cases with a minimal 
and secret religious practice (occasional church attendance, baptizing children, tak-
ing the sacrament of marriage) and celebrating Christmas during the Soviet regime. 
After its collapse a usually vague religious identity was expressed in the same way 
with possibly greater church attendance for formal participation in major religious 
feasts without looking for a personal relation with God and deeper knowledge of the 
Christian faith. The main orientation and interests are concentrated on one’s private 
life and family well-being, which is matched within-group criticism of political reali-
ty and even its ignorance noticed by many informants. All that gained ground already 
since the late Soviet period and today has reappeared as a form of social conformism 
(Klumbys, 2012, p. 255‒256; Putinaitė, 2007, p. 77).
The majority of religiously indifferent informants did not speak or were inclined 
to avoid speaking about any existential confusion regarding their social preferences 
and their personal perplexity due to the dramatic events that occurred in their family 
or the lives of their children (divorces, alcoholism, suicide etc.). In describing or re-
flecting on their choices, the informants usually explained: “Times were hard”, thus 
justifying in a different way their stronger or more moderate ideological and social 
conformity: “Religious belief inherited from parents confronted atheistic ideas im-
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posed in school – how was it possible to match them? I think that an individual takes 
from one or another attitude the points that he needs” (Vladas, 1936). “My largest 
worry during the Soviet times was the question ‘What should I do, should I go to 
church when my parents die and other family members decide to bury them with re-
ligious ceremonies? Thanks to God my father died already in the present times, but 
when during Soviet period my mother died, we asked to celebrate the Mass in early 
morning, and my husband who was a Party secretary did not enter the church...” (Ve-
ronika, 1944).
b. types of religious indifference and general social orientations
In the results of the analysis of informants’ oral life histories and while trying not 
to lose their Gestalt, we could distinguish three main types of religious indifference 
that will be described further (Picture 1). In general, they are characterized by the ab-
sence of personal experience in relation to God and a definite concept of a human in-
dividual that usually belittles one’s existence and the meaning of life. This could even 
manifest as culturally accepted and formally practiced religiousness in childhood due 
to the insistence of parents – mainly the mother or/and grandmother (in reciting the 
rosary, saying one’s prayers and, in the Soviet times secretly taking the First Com-
munion), which was disproved already in adolescence by accepting the atheistic or 
“scientific” worldview. However, a possible casual religious or more cultural prac-
tice both during and after Soviet religious persecutions still was expressed in family 
gatherings for the celebration of Christmas Eve (Kūčios). In Lithuania that is a cul-
turally transmitted way of sharing Christmas bread with or without a short prayer and 
eating special dishes together.
Even during the Soviet regime Christmas Eve was celebrated with a family meal 
despite a possible risk to be incriminated with anti-Soviet behaviour. “We closed our 
windows and gathered to eat Kūčios in our parents’ house. I remember once that a rat-
tat startled us. Mother went to open the door... There was our neighbour who dared 
to bring us kūčiukai (small pieces of specially baked bread) that we already also 
had” (Elena, 1943).The students who did not manage to return home to their fami-
lies that usually lived in the country side for this feast used to gather in somebody’s 
room in the dormitory to have this supper behind the closed doors because ideolog-
ical control during that evening was strengthened “They were caught in the act on 
that evening... But then we did not even punish these students-girls, because we our-
selves ate Kūčios on Christmas Eve at our parents’ home. The dormitories were full 
of kūčiukai and other Christmas Eve dishes that students brought with them from 
home...”(Monika, 1945). Usually such practices of celebration were and still are the 
only manifestation of their culturally inherited Catholicity, which is expressed in reli-
gious habitus without any other practice and a vague understanding of Christian faith 
(reduced to family celebration of Christmas and Easter, baptizing children, religious 
funerals and seldom going to church to sit in silence or meditation).
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picture 1. personal and familial social experiences in informants’ life histories, which formed an 
orientation towards religious indifference and social conformism in post-soviet society (the lithu-
anian case)
The first type of religious indifference could be distinguished on the basis of life 
histories of several of those informants who themselves or their family members par-
ticipated in the Soviet ideological system. They belong to that part of the older gen-
eration that actively conformed to the system by becoming party members and taking 
some responsibilities in Soviet structures (teachers, participants of atheistic propa-
ganda and other professionals with official positions). These religious indifferent in-
formants were baptized in early childhood, usually had some experience of formal 
religiousness in their families and joined the Soviet organizational system with a sin-
cere zeal to be its part (speaking about positive Soviet social achievements and even 
spying upon school children and colleagues who attended church on religious feasts 
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etc.) Meanwhile with the collapse of the regime many of them became active Cath-
olics usually seeking positions in the structure of the politically and ideologically 
changed social system with the same zeal (many teachers in the life history of Dovilė, 
1971) or finally orienting themselves to their private life and survival in the present 
social situation. They tried to describe their former activity justifying it by the ne-
cessity to “live, have a job and maintain a family” (Ona, 1935) or even “to do good 
to the ordinary people in these complicated circumstances”(Veronika, 1944; Moni-
ka, 1945; Juozas, 1949). Except in the case of religious conversion (Monika, 1945) 
they still did not have and even understand their lack of personal relation to God, and 
found their formal Catholic practice sufficient.
The second type of religious indifference is more typical of the younger gener-
ation that was born in the 1960s and 1970s and absorbed the general indifferent or 
even apathetic social orientations of the later period of Soviet reality and climate. 
They were secretly baptized, did not have any religious practice in their childhood, 
collectively joined the pioneer and, later, komsomol organizations, looked with in-
difference or ignored the atheistic propaganda in schools that had already lost its 
previous zeal and directed all their interest to private life and professional career. 
However, several informants who belonged to the older generation were born in re-
ligiously active families, practiced their faith not only in childhood but also occa-
sionally during the Soviet period (usually when visiting their parents’ families who 
lived in countryside), secretly took the sacrament of marriage and baptized their chil-
dren. During the Soviet times due to their professional career they even had impor-
tant positions in the Soviet organizational and ideological system, but tried to be re-
strained in expressing their social orientations and kept silent especially on religious 
matters. With the collapse of the Soviet regime they were affected by the general in-
terest in social participation in national meetings and discussions, but finally did not 
join them actively. Both men of the older generation continued their professional ca-
reer for a while but, like other informants in this group, were later disappointed with 
the changes of the new social system: “Part of socially active people at present are 
those who have turned their coats for pragmatic reasons and private goals, so not eve-
rything is as good as many have expected...” (Povilas, 1937); “Earlier, when some so-
cially responsible people did bad things, others at least knew where they could com-
plain about them (in the local committee of the Communist party); there were no such 
thefts or crimes as there are now, and at least some official order existed. But now we 
often use the word “democracy” whenever everybody wants, and no clear responsi-
bilities exist...” (Vladas, 1936).
Part of the informants with this type of religious identity began to attend church 
more often, several of them because they met some religious people, and even ad-
dressed religious topics, but finally neglected them. They became mostly formal Cath-
olics “like all the others” with a primary orientation to job, family and living every-
day life. The younger informants expressed no interest in social civic or political 
activity as well as in participation in church life and even in questions of the Christian 
faith. The attitude “to live like others”encompasses all spheres of their life express-
ing a general orientation to social conformity: “as it is said,‘needs must when the dev-
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il drives’. Corruption is everywhere – in the entire world. So if you do not use it, you 
will remain a goof because others will improve their things and you won’t. Moreo-
ver, we will all finally die and rot. And that’s all...” (Veronika, 1944); “In the begin-
ning I tried to be active, but then I hit the bottom, because all that makes no sense – 
too much of a nerve-wracking thing when you see how people seek to be in power 
and use it for their personal gains, and others – especially young people – emigrate 
looking for a job” (Drasius, 1973). Such attitudes mostly expressed in private circles 
gradually form a new social conformism. 
The third type of religious indifference is expressed in personal unbelief or non-
theism as a not publicly manifested orientation and action directed against the belief in 
God. This group of six informants (both men and women) differed from others in two 
essential aspects: they were not baptized or did not know about it, and nobody in their 
family or among their fellowmen practiced and personally witnessed the religious at-
titude towards reality as well as genuine religious practice in the early period of the 
informant’s life: “There were even no questions or doubts about religious matters...” 
(Algis, 1967). “I am not baptized until now and there is no need for it. My grandpar-
ents from my mother’s side were even ‘red’, as people say about those who were So-
viet oriented, and my mother was a party member” (Vilma, 1957); “My mother was 
a Communist party secretary of our city, her sister was politically active as well, and 
there were no signs or symbols of religion in our home, I was even sceptical about 
it. All my friends (perhaps it was my choice) were from non-religious families as well” 
(Daina, 1959). In one case there was a church-going grandmother, but the atheist atti-
tudes of the informant’s parents and full acceptance and practice of atheist life and So-
viet propaganda during the school period extinguished that first fragile religious ex-
perience of early childhood: “I remember conversations with my grandmother about 
God trying to explain to this old woman that God did not exist, that all religion was the 
opium of the people. And I was sure that it was really so” (Dovilė, 1971). 
Finally, in the personal lives of these unbelievers no space was assigned for God’s 
possible existence. Their social orientations were formed in most cases by their fam-
ily life during the Soviet regime: “My mother worked in the sphere of sales and ful-
filled the needs of socially important people... She used her official position to pro-
vide them with goods that were absent in shops, but no... she did not steal. To steal 
means to steal from individuals, but what she and others did was a normal thing – 
help, responding to people needs” (Algis, 1967). Meanwhile, when being asked addi-
tional questions, several younger informants expressed their moral orientations to be-
havioural life choices defining them in notions typical of secular humanism: “Life is 
meaningful to me when I can help somebody who has primal needs, do good, some-
thing nice to others...” (Drasius, 1973). However, social orientations both in the Sovi-
et period and in the present time were evidently directed to their private lives, mate-
rial well-being of their family without any social activity, and they usually expressed 
that in neutral or ironic attitudes to Soviet reality as well as in reserved or negative 
evaluation of the outcomes of the post-Soviet social transition: “It’s better not to 
know, not to go deep into this reality, but to live your private life and do your work... 
because people do not feel protected, so they do not risk to meddle in” (Rimas, 1965).
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conclusion 
The novelty of the present research into the influence of religious indifference on 
social orientations in post-Soviet society is, on the one hand, in using the complemen-
tarity of two empirical research methods – quantitative and qualitative – to assess the 
different aspects of the phenomenon and to explain the findings of one research for 
the other; on the other hand, the post-communist contradictory situation of religious 
changes and transitional social orientations is analysed in relation to the former So-
viet experience, which itself is already widely investigated using qualitative research 
methods but not yet exploring the outcomes of that experience for the contemporary 
state of personal religious identity. The analysis of religious indifference and social 
orientations in the context of personal life experiences in both radically different po-
litical-ideological systems gives a possibility to understand the peculiarities of post-
Soviet changes both in religious and social life, and the phenomenon of social con-
formism. 
Lithuania’s case is interesting in this perspective because of its collectivistic reli-
giousness (the largest part of formal or casual believers among post-communist tradi-
tionally Catholic countries) and mostly negative evaluation of existing social chang-
es: a low level of trust in social institutions, low voluntary activity and a negative 
attitude towards life in general (including high rates of suicide). How does it relate 
with a conformist orientation as a historically long-lasting social habitus? 
The research permits to consider that the dominant formal and nominal Catho-
lic identity is a complex phenomenon, which accommodates cultural heritage and so-
cial compliance that support and develop contemporary religious indifference. It can 
lead to a further increase in individualism and decrease in Christian identity both in 
the appreciation of a human person and social coherence. The analysis of life histo-
ries of religiously indifferent and/or formal Catholics discloses the roots and types of 
this phenomenon. A peculiar outcome of the Soviet regime is the type of complete re-
ligious unbelief formed by the absence of a social possibility to meet the reality of re-
ligious life and experience – the possible existence of transcendence through the wit-
nessing of others. It established a life frame without any possibility of space for the 
personal God. This new type of religious indifference or individual non-theism is not 
typical of general Lithuanian culturally Catholic identity and is a specific case here. 
However, the influence and spread of the European secular worldview among the 
younger generation can turn this disbelief as a religious attitude that is matched with 
individualistic orientations to well-being and social detachment from the political re-
ality into a new form of social conformism. Even if people still feel less socially se-
cure and less indifferent to existential questions and God’s existence in comparison 
with post-war generations in Western Europe, this social adjustment as compliance 
gradually becomes a historically inherited social habitus related with the prevailing 
concept of an individual and the social experience of oneself. Together with the  other 
two types of post-Soviet religious indifference and/or formal Catholicity, the reli-
gious unbelief even more embodies that phenomenon and at least partly clarifies the 
above-mentioned social problems of Lithuanian society.
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